BJPS Book Review of "Categories for the Working Philosopher" by Teh, Nicholas & Kapulkin, Chris
Reviewed by Chris Kapulkin and Nicholas Teh
Categories for the Working Philosopher  
Elaine Landry (ed.) 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, £75.00  
ISBN 9780198748991
The publication of Saunders Mac Lane’s ([1971])  Categories for the Working 
Mathematician(CWM) was a signal event in the history of category theory. This 
influential textbook grew out of the recognition that there had emerged a well-
established body of material that one might consider ‘basic’ category theory, and that it 
provided an architecture of concepts (such as categories, functors, limits, and adjoints) 
that unified many areas of mathematics. One of the explicit aims of CWM was thus to 
transmit this meta-mathematical lingua franca to mathematicians in other subfields.
In the following years, the unificatory power, generality, and foundational import of 
category theory have made it fertile soil not only for mathematical but also philosophical 
thought, and so it is a pleasure to see some of this work expertly curated by Elaine 
Landry in her homage to Mac Lane: Categories for the Working Philosopher  (CWP). 
Like CWM, CWP seeks to convey the fundamental concepts of category theory to a 
broad audience, especially philosophers of X(where X  is a subject to which category 
theory has made a significant contribution or has the potential to do so). But there are 
some important differences in the scope and context of these respective works. First, 
while CWM organizes and transmits a collection of categorical concepts that might 
uncontroversially be regarded as ‘basic’, category theory has since experienced an 
explosive development in various sub-areas, for example, ∞-categories in logic and 
algebraic topology, ‘categorification’ in representation theory and knot theory, and the 
use of topos theory and ‘derived’ methods in algebraic geometry. Thus, beyond a 
minimal core of background knowledge (for example, the contents of Borceux [1994a], 
[1994b], [1994c]), what counts as basic knowledge depends heavily on the sub-area of 
category theory with which one is concerned. Since Landry’s volume is rightly intended 
to give the reader a flavour of new concepts and techniques that have arisen within 
these sub-areas, its scope is significantly more ambitious than that of CWM and the 
material is correspondingly less unified. A second difference is that while CWM is 
concerned with the relevance of category theory for pure mathematics, one finds in 
CWP a roughly equal division between pure (Chapters 1–10) and applied (Chapters 11–
19) material, where the latter includes applications to physics, biology, and the 
philosophy of science.
The breath-taking scope of the material covered in CWP makes it particularly 
challenging to identify some core set of themes that confer a narrative unity upon the 
various chapters in this volume (beyond the true but unhelpful statement that the 
chapters all concern category theory!). Nonetheless, we believe that one can discern 
two such themes, which provide the reader with a useful (although by no means the 
only) path through this material.
Theme A—which is dominant in the pure chapters—is that the ‘principle of 
extensionality’ (PE) is the key to understanding why category theory is conceptually or 
foundationally illuminating, and thus drives many developments in modern category 
theory. We note that (as will be evident below) we adopt the sense of ‘extensionality’ 
most commonly used by category theorists, and not the—antithetical—sense that is 
adopted by set theorists. Roughly speaking, PE stipulates that one should not ‘look 
inside’ a mathematical object (for example, by considering the elements of a set) to 
determine whether two objects or constructions are identical. One way in which PE can 
be formalized in category theory is via the Yoneda lemma (and its higher-categorical 
generalizations), which asserts that two objects of a category are isomorphic (or 
suitably n-equivalent) whenever they are related in the same way to all objects of that 
category. By contrast, the use of set theory as a candidate foundation of mathematics 
violates PE, because of the so-called axiom of extensionality—a sense of 
‘extensionality’ that differs from our own and that of the category theory community!—in 
ZFC (according to this axiom, two sets are equal if and only if they have the same 
elements; hence one is required to ‘look inside’ the sets to examine whether or not they 
are equal). An important immediate consequence of PE is the invariance of all 
categorical constructions under isomorphism in a category (and the higher-dimensional 
analogues of this statement). In the literature, this statement is sometimes called the 
principle of equivalence (nlab [2018]); below, we shall treat it as the restriction of PE to 
the special case of ‘groupoids’, namely, categories in which all arrows between objects 
are invertible.
Theme A can be seen as motivating two projects: A1, the use of category theory to 
rearticulate some branch of logic or mathematics so that one can implement PE in 
specific contexts; and A2, the far more ambitious programme of using category theory to 
build PE into the very foundations of logic and mathematics, thus making PE an 
‘intrinsic’ feature of one’s linguistic framework, as it were. On the other hand, Theme B
—which is dominant in the applied chapters—is the project of abstractly conceptualizing 
a scientific theory (or certain aspects of it) so that the resulting description is amenable 
to the methods of category theory. We shall have more to say about the extent to which 
these two themes dovetail at the end of our review.
Based on the above hermeneutic, one way of reading the pure chapters of CWP is as 
motivating a progression from A1 to A2. An introduction to the logical application of A1 is 
given in Chapter 7, where John Bell summarizes the advances in categorical logic from 
its conception in the 1960s up to roughly 1990. Among the main topics addressed are 
Lawvere’s functorial semantics and the topos-theoretic description of logic. These early 
developments and results relating different kinds of logics to different kinds of categories 
(called ‘hyperdoctrines’) set the stage for the remaining nine pure chapters. In Chapter 
9, Kohei Kishida extends this approach to logic by using category theory to describe 
modal logic and its semantics. We recall that in Lawvere’s view, the syntax of a logic is a 
category and its models are given by functors from this category to some target 
category. By contrast, in Kishida’s re-articulation of modal logic, the syntax is a functor 
and the models are certain natural transformations (namely, arrows between functors). 
While the development of mathematical logic in the twentieth century has generally 
placed more emphasis on syntax than semantics, we note that category theory also has 
something to contribute to syntax-heavy systems; for instance, Chapter 10 by J. R. B. 
Cockett and R. A. G. Seely reviews how symmetric monoidal categories can be used to 
develop a categorical semantics for linear logic.
It is relatively uncontroversial that category theory is ‘foundational’ in the sense that it 
has provided many areas of mathematics with a convenient linguistic framework in 
which to reason. However, and far more controversially, category theory has also been 
put forward as a foundation for all of mathematics, and in particular one that does not 
rely on set theory. This claim has been the subject of ongoing debate: could and should 
a categorical foundation replace the more familiar set-theoretic one? In Chapter 5, 
Michael Ernst provides an overview of this debate. While the debate has previously 
focused on technical adequacy and the autonomy of each of these competing 
foundations, Ernst chooses instead to emphasize the question of which foundations 
best capture the practice of working mathematicians. This chapter, along with Chapters 
1 and 6, can be viewed as a bridge between A1 and A2, because it reflects on the 
significance of the fact that PE encodes an essential insight from mathematical practice 
and is responsible for the fruitfulness of using category theory to re-articulate known 
mathematical structures. For instance, in Chapter 1, Colin McLarty surveys the various 
scenarios in which a working mathematician might encounter set theory and concludes 
that what ultimately matters to practitioners is our aforementioned PE. His main 
example here is the fact that there are many equivalent—but not equal—constructions 
of a tangent bundle and the fact that practitioners only care about these up to the 
structural properties that determine their equivalence. Along similar lines, Jean-Pierre 
Marquis argues in Chapter 6 that the notion of ‘canonical maps’ illustrates how category 
theory provides insight into the structural character of mathematics that is not provided 
by set theory.
While category theory can yield such insights, there are still areas of mathematics 
whose structural description requires us to enhance our meta-mathematical framework 
beyond categories. An example of such an area is… (1)-category theory itself! To 
illustrate this point, consider that from the set-theoretic perspective, the standard of 
sameness of two categories is equality; similarly, one might be tempted to say that from 
the category-theoretic perspective, the relevant standard is isomorphism. However, we 
know from the practice of category theory that we miss out on many interesting 
phenomena if our standard of sameness is as strict as isomorphism—in fact, it is often 
fruitful to relax this standard to a weaker one called ‘categorical equivalence’. How can 
we build into our meta-mathematical description a principle that will yield the ‘right’ 
standard of sameness for categories (or higher categories)?
One attempt to do so is Michael Makkai’s FOLDS (first-order logic with dependent 
sorts), which is presented by Marquis in Chapter 8. For instance, in the FOLDS theory 
of categories, two categories are equal if and only if they are equivalent. As one might 
expect, while FOL has a natural interpretation in sufficiently structured categories, the 
general interpretation of FOLDS requires the resources of higher categories. On the 
other hand, one can take a different tack from Makkai and use the existing system of 
Martin–Löf type theory as the basis for a system that captures the relevant notion of 
sameness. This approach—now known as homotopy type theory (HoTT)—was taken by 
Vladimir Voevodsky, who noticed a close connection between the notion of ‘equality’ in 
independent type theory and the notion of ‘homotopy’ that is familiar from topology.
The origins of HoTT are explained by Michael Shulman’s Chapter 3, after which Steve 
Awodey’s Chapter 4 presents the univalence axiom of HoTT as the ultimate form of 
structuralism. To state the univalence axiom, consider that for any two objects, A and B, 
in a (possibly higher) category, one may consider a map taking ‘a proof that A and B are 
equal’ to ‘an equivalence between A and B’. The univalence axiom then asserts that this 
map itself is an equivalence, that is, in suitable sense, every equivalence arises from a 
proof of equality. While it may at first seem that this axiom restricts the class of 
equivalences in a category, in fact it does the opposite: it extends the notion of equality 
to match that of equivalence. This formally forbids the user of a foundational system 
from making any statements that would violate PE, thus turning a philosophical principle 
into a foundational axiom. Upon closer examination, the univalence axiom bears close 
resemblance to the object classifier of an ∞-topos, as defined by Jacob Lurie ([2009]). It 
is believed (although not yet proven) that HoTT is the internal language of such ∞-topoi; 
this more elaborate set of connections figures in David Corfield’s Chapter 2, which 
describes Urs Schreiber’s novel approach to geometry, namely, doing geometry 
‘internally’ to an ∞-topos.
To sum up, one way of reading the ‘pure’ chapters of CWP is as building up to an 
explication of how in recent mathematics PE has been implemented in ever more 
thorough-going ways. We now turn to the ‘applied’ chapters of CWP.
In Chapter 16, David Spivak makes a compelling case for the fruitfulness of category 
theory as a model of the models that we use in the applied sciences: this case 
essentially turns on using PE (in the guise of Yoneda) to articulate the relationships 
between such models. Furthermore, he rightly stresses a point that highlights our 
Theme B: a large part of the task of applying category theory to some discipline consists 
in understanding which aspects of a theory one should conceptualize in categorical 
terms, and the level of abstraction one needs to work at in order for this choice to be 
mathematically and scientifically fruitful. For instance, Joachim Lambek’s (posthumous) 
Chapter 14 provides an intriguing—if idiosyncratic—illustration of this task by describing 
a small fragment of field theory (Dirac spinors on Minkowski spacetime) as an additive 
category.
For a rather more ambitious and comprehensive attempt to conceptualize aspects of 
physics in terms of category theory, the reader need look no further than Chapters 11 
and 12, which review the work of the ‘Oxford school’, who apply category theory to 
quantum mechanics. In Chapter 11, Samson Abramsky reviews how the probabilistic 
data of quantum theory can be conceptualized in terms of a presheaf that assigns such 
data to various sets of compatible measurements. Among other things, this powerful 
abstraction of (part of) the structure of quantum theory allows one to provide a 
classification of the phenomenon of ‘contextuality’ (that is, the ‘inconsistent’ aggregation 
of data from the perspective of classical probability), to apply this classificatory scheme 
to non-quantum theories, and (in principle) to apply the full category-theoretic machinery 
that has been developed for sheaves (and their higher analogues) to such an analysis. 
In Chapter 12, Bob Coecke and Aleks Kissinger provide the first of a three-part overview 
of the programme called ‘categorical quantum mechanics’.[1] Here we see that many of 
the key concepts of quantum information theory (for example, compositionality, 
causality, no-cloning, teleportation, non-locality) can be abstracted and formalized within 
the setting of symmetric monoidal categories with further structure; thus, these concepts 
can also be applied to non-quantum theories that share a similar categorical structure. 
While much of applied category theory has focused on the case of mathematical 
physics, Andrée Ehresmann’s Chapter 15 shows that category theory can also be 
fruitfully applied within specific frameworks for modelling living systems and for 
modelling cognitive systems in biology.
Chapters 13 and 17 of CWP are directed at the broad topic of how category theory can 
be used to formalize relationships between various scientific theories. In order to 
provide a toy model of how category theory can be used to compare theories, one can 
simply treat the theory’s models as structured sets collected into categories of various 
kinds. In Chapter 13, James Weatherall assumes this set-up and discusses how 
statements about differences between various fragments of physical theories can be re-
articulated in the language of ‘forgetful functors’ and in particular Baez’s taxonomy of 
‘structure’, ‘property’, and ‘stuff’-forgetting functors. We note that this topic is in fact 
deeply related to (the equivalence principle case of) PE: Baez’s taxonomy was originally 
intended to apply to the homotopy theory of  n-groupoids (Baez and Shulman 
[unpublished]), and the relationship between this application and the notion of theories/
models (as well as ‘gauge symmetry’) has been discussed in both the philosophy 
(Dougherty [2017]; Nguyen et al. [forthcoming]) and the physics (Benini et al. [2015]; 
Schreiber and Shulman [unpublished]) literature. In Chapter 17, Hans Halvorson and 
Dimitris Tsementzis describe how ‘syntactic’ and ‘semantic’ categories can be 
associated with certain logical theories and proceed to use topos-theoretic techniques 
to discuss the relationships (in particular, equivalence) between such categories. They 
then consider a two-category of logical theories and discuss the sense in which this 
might help us understand (analogically) various relationships between actual scientific 
theories.
Finally, Landry’s Chapter 18 discusses the uses and abuses of category theory within 
the metaphysics of science, especially with respect to the position known as ‘radical 
ontic structural realism’ (ROSR). She argues (persuasively, in our view) that any attempt 
to use only the categorically described mathematical structure of a physical theory to 
argue in favour of ROSR will founder, because in order to succeed, such an argument 
requires an appeal to the object-level physical structure of phenomena. However, 
Landry also argues that the conceptual resources of category theory (in particular PE) 
vindicate a certain sort of Hilbertian mathematical structuralism.
Professor Landry is to be congratulated on putting together a stimulating volume that 
introduces a broad audience to so many of the key conceptual, foundational, and 
philosophical ideas driving contemporary work at the intersection of philosophy and 
category theory. In closing, we make two small observations that may be helpful to the 
reader. First, despite the importance in contemporary category theory of ∞-categories 
(which one might think of as ‘going all the way with PE’!), discussion of this concept 
seems to be largely absent from CWP (apart from the chapters of Marquis, Shulman, 
and Corfield, which gesture at ∞-categories). Second, there seems to be something of a 
disjunction between the pure and applied parts of CWP: Recall that the narrative of the 
pure part seems to yield a clear, overarching moral: an ever-deeper implementation of 
PE is required to comprehend mathematical practice, thus culminating in our Theme A2. 
However, it is less than clear that the applied discussions cohere enough to provide a 
unified moral of this kind. Could there, for instance, be a physical or philosophical or (in 
the applied realm) methodological principle to motivate an analogous moral, or that 
yields a more trenchant analysis of Theme B (which seems very much to be a theme at 
the level of  technê)? And can one say something systematic and principled about the 
relationship between Theme B and Theme A? Discussion of these points would further 
clarify the importance of category theory for the philosophy of science and for the 
philosophy of the specialized sciences.
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Notes
[1] This first part treats purely quantum processes, whereas the second part includes 
classical data and its interaction with quantum data, and the third part treats the 
concepts of observables and complementarity by means of ‘internal’ Frobenius and 
Hopf algebras.
